Complex Adaptive Systems, Evolutionism, and Ecology within Anthropology:  Interdisciplinary Research for Understanding Cultural and Ecological Dynamics by Abel, Tom
Journal of Ecological Anthropology
Volume 2
Issue 1 Volume 2, Issue 1 (1998) Article 1
1998
Complex Adaptive Systems, Evolutionism, and
Ecology within Anthropology: Interdisciplinary
Research for Understanding Cultural and
Ecological Dynamics
Tom Abel
University of Florida, Department of Anthropology
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea
This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Anthropology at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
of Ecological Anthropology by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Abel, Tom. "Complex Adaptive Systems, Evolutionism, and Ecology within Anthropology: Interdisciplinary Research for
Understanding Cultural and Ecological Dynamics." Journal of Ecological Anthropology 2, no. 1 (1998): 6-29.
Available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol2/iss1/1
6 Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology Vol. 2 1998
Complex Adaptive Systems, Evolutionism, and Ecology within
Anthropology: Interdisciplinary Research for Understanding
Cultural and Ecological Dynamics
Tom Abel
Department of Anthropology
University of Florida
We now know that far from equilibrium, new types of structures may originate spontaneously.  In far-from-equilibrium
conditions we may have transformation from disorder, from thermal chaos, into order.  New dynamic states of matter
may originate, states that reflect the interaction of a given system with its surroundings.  We have called these new
structures dissipative structures to emphasize the constructive role of dissipative processes in their formation.
—Prigogine and Stengers 1984:12
A Science of Complex Systems
Recently the ecologist C.S. Holling has
discussed the conflict between “two streams of sci-
ence” and the confusion it creates for politicians
and the public (Holling 1995:12-16; see also
Holling 1993:553-4).  One stream is experimen-
tal, reductionist, and narrowly disciplinary.  It is
familiar to us as the scientific ideal.  The less fa-
miliar stream is interdisciplinary, integrative, his-
torical, analytical, comparative, and experimental
at appropriate scales.  Examples given of the first
form are molecular biology and genetic engineer-
ing.  The second form is found in evolutionary
biology and systems approaches in populations,
ecosystems, landscapes, and global dynamics.  One
stream is a science of parts, the other a science of
the integration of parts.
Anthropology has held itself up to the first
stream ideal of science.  But the first stream ideal
does not always produce the results in anthropol-
ogy that proponents and critics alike have de-
manded.  Our knowledge of detail is incomplete
at societal scales, and prediction can fail.  Disproof
by experiment is unlikely even with “natural ex-
periments.”  And unanimous agreement over re-
sults is almost never reached.  One response by
anthropologists has been to shrink temporal and
spatial scales, and hold fast to the ideal; to let the
requirements of the scientific methods of this first
stream of science structure our research.  Anthro-
pologists are often dissatisfied with such restric-
tions on our object of study, but see little alterna-
tive if anthropology is to become a mature science.
But science itself is always evolving.  Many
anthropologists, both proponents of science and
critics, are unaware of the constructive critiques
now coming from the mature disciplines of sci-
ence, from the “hard” sciences.  For over twenty
years scientists like Holling and Nobel prize chemist
Ilya Prigogine (Prigogine 1980, Prigogine and
Stengers 1984) have been arguing that the first
stream of science is limited to certain problem sets.
They contend that a science of complexity has fun-
damentally different features, and is the proper
approach to other problem sets.  The subject mat-
ter of anthropological inquiry, it will be shown, is
commonly addressed in problem sets of the sec-
ond type.  In fact, anthropologists long have ar-
gued their case for understanding cultures in terms
that sound remarkably like those advocated by the
new science of complexity.  We have been fighting
to resemble the ideal of science, while a second
form is coming to look like us.
Points for Anthropology
Holling identifies a number of character-
istics of the integrative stream of science.  It incor-
porates technologies and results from reduction-
ist, experimental science, but does not expect dis-
proof by experiment and ultimate agreement by
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the scientific community.  Models are multivari-
ate and multi-scaled, and testing of alternative hy-
potheses is done by planned and unplanned inter-
ventions into whole systems in case studies, with
the evaluation of the integrated consequence of
each alternative.  Multiple lines of converging evi-
dence are used to argue for one hypothesis over
another in a process of peer assessment and judg-
ment.
While these ground rules for research
might be revolutionary in the physical sciences,
anthropology has long been forced by our subject
into this type of science.  Case study ethnographies
are our hallmark.  Experimental disproof is diffi-
cult and uncertainty is high.  Peer assessment, judg-
ment, and argument–not final agreement–are the
norm.  We view cultures as integrated wholes, with
systemic interrelationships of parts.  We make cross-
cultural comparisons, extracting multiple lines of
converging evidence to bolster our arguments.
Each of these characteristics we have been forced
to adopt in order to deal with the complexity of
culture, and culture-environment interactions.
In addition to these shared fundamentals,
the second stream of science incorporates features
that are less familiar to anthropologists.  In the
study of ecosystems or global systems, biota and
environment are seen to affect one another at mul-
tiple scales and in profound ways.  The geophysi-
cal environment is not a fixed background for liv-
ing organisms, it structures and is structured by
the presence of life.  Only ecosystems-ecological
anthropologists have attempted to incorporate this
type of insight, and we have been tough critics of
ourselves and that effort.  Larger scale human-eco-
system interactions were once thought, by anthro-
pologists (and ecologists), to be homeostatic in the
short term, and linear and progressive in cultural
evolutionary terms.  More recently however, ad-
vances in theory and research have greatly modi-
fied the understanding of the nonlinear dynamics
and thermodynamics of biogeophysical evolution
(Prigogine 1980; Wicken 1987; Depew and We-
ber 1995), and of ecosystems (O’Neil et al. 1986;
Holling 1986, 1995; Ulanowicz 1986, 1996;
Odum 1983, 1996a), and ecological anthropolo-
gists have just begun to make use of the new in-
sights (cf. Adams 1988; Park 1992; Acheson and
Wilson 1996; South 1990; Ehrenreich et al. 1995;
Gumerman and Gell-Mann 1994; Kohler 1992).
Anthropologists have made some use of
multiple scale analysis in the study of culture.  We
have recognized the need to move away from study-
ing communities as isolates, and toward placing
them within global relationships (Bennet 1988;
DeWalt and Pelto 1985; Moran 1990).  But the
study of scale and hierarchy in ecosystems analysis
is far more robust than this, and should prove in-
valuable for understanding the structure and func-
tion of human-environment and human-human
relationships.  The multi-scale, hierarchical rela-
tionships that exist in ecosystems require sophisti-
cated methodologies of analysis and ecologists are
committed to computer modeling as a central tool.
This too diverges from the first stream of science
in which modeling is only one tool among many,
and anthropologists, specifically, have made little
use of computer modeling, especially of the types
used now to study complex systems (Lansing’s
[1991] work is suggestive of the possibilities).
Finally, the expectations and goals of sci-
ence as advocated by Holling’s second stream di-
verge from the first, and again seem to echo
anthropology’s past as well as suggest a future.  The
new stream of science is only weakly predictive.
The nature of the dynamics of complex systems
makes this so.  Surprise and uncertainty are ex-
pected, and are important structuring features of
evolution in nature.  A science of complex systems
is then “retrospective and historical” (or
retrodictive) in nature.   An ecosystem is a “mov-
ing target”, constantly evolving at multiple spatial
and temporal scales.  Our knowledge of a system
is always incomplete, and surprise is inevitable.  We
can hope to understand a system’s evolution after
the fact, but prediction and control, as with bio-
logical evolution, is by its nature impossible.  Long
branded a failing of functionalist and cultural evo-
lutionary theoretical frameworks, incomplete pre-
dictability is seen as a fundamental property of
complex natural systems.
8 Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology Vol. 2 1998
Comparing Ecological and Social Systems
Ecologists, chemists, physicists, and oth-
ers from the “hard” sciences, have been eager to
apply insights from the new science of complexity
to understanding social systems (Allen 1982;
Costanza et al. 1993; De Greene 1993; Dyke 1988;
Eldredge and Grene 1992; Forrester 1987;
Garfinkel 1987; Geyer 1991; Gunderson et al.
1995; Harvey and Reed 1994; Holling 1995;
Iberall 1985, 1987; Jantsch 1982; Kahil and
Boulding 1996; Lancaster 1989; Loye and Eisler
1987; Maruyama 1982; Nicolis and Prigogine
1989; Odum 1983, 1996a; Ulanowicz 1996).
There is a great need for anthropologists to enter
into the debate on these issues.  Well-established
anthropological theory could greatly contribute to
better interdisciplinary theory building, and par-
ticipation by anthropologists would eliminate the
tendency to reinvent theory, or to choose a long
discredited path.  Anthropology represents argu-
ably the best source for social theory that can be
applied to this effort.  Of the social sciences, an-
thropology has the time depth, the comparative
data, and the bent for evolutionary-ecological-eco-
nomic thinking that is necessary.
Gunderson et al. (1995), in Holling’s ed-
ited volume, is an example of the way ecological
systems theory has been applied to social systems.
Their understanding of function, hierarchy, and
scale in nature is fascinating, incorporating
Holling’s now well known theory of ecosystem
function (1986) with hierarchy theory (Allen and
Starr 1982; O’Neill et al. 1986) into a general
model of the dynamics of adaptive systems.1   In
the article, their complex adaptive systems model
is applied to understanding rigidity and change in
1 In the model, systems in nature continually cycle through the four phases of Exploitation, Conservation, Release (or
Creative Destruction), and Reorganization.  In ecosystems, r-strategists in the Exploitation phase give way to K-strategists
in the Conservation phase.  However, as interconnectedness increases, conditions become ripe for chance events such as fire,
storm or pest to Release stored nutrients and organized carbon.  In the final phase there is Reorganization of (some) released
capital and movement towards a next Exploitation phase.  Adaptive four phase cycles occur in nature that is hierarchical in
space and time.  Semi-autonomous levels of adaptive cycles interconnect variables that share similar speed and size relation-
ships.  Slow and large levels set the conditions at which faster and smaller levels exits.  However the relationship between
levels is not simply uni-directional.  Fast and small variables in chance conditions can have significant effects on slower levels
at critical times in the four phase cycle.  An example is insect outbreak that may significantly alter a forest structure if a
particular threshold condition has been reached in the forest.
government wildlife management institutions.
They review some relevant social change theories
from the social sciences, searching for, and find-
ing, theories or components of theories that ap-
pear to mesh with their position.
While this approach seems reasonable, it
is too problem specific, focusing on change in
management institutions, and omitting the cul-
tural, ecological, and evolutionary context of those
institutions.  Their choice of social theories is eclec-
tic, settling on theory that is surprisingly un-eco-
logical, temporally small-scaled, and spatially re-
stricted to western style bureaucratic management
(i.e., institution and organization theory, risk and
decision making).  Their theory of complex adap-
tive systems incorporates a large body of well-stud-
ied ecosystem function and process into a general,
nomothetic model of system organization and
change.  It deserves to be wed to nomothetic social
theory which is founded on equally well-studied
models of cultural process and function.  It is at
this point that social change theory can then con-
tribute to understanding the specific problems of
resource management they wish to address.
Where’s the Ecology?
When the social is borrowed into physi-
cal and biological models, it is usually accom-
plished with cultural models of the familiar, of
“entrepreneurs”, and “bureaucracy”, and “man-
agement”.   The social theory adopted by
Gunderson et al. (1995), and by most other
ecologists, scientists, and policy makers who have
ventured into the game of applying theories of
complexity to social systems, is surprisingly un-
ecological and un-evolutionary.  Most often
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol2/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.2.1.1
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defective human values, uninformed manage-
ment decisions, undemocratic political systems,
or uneducated voters are identified as the cause.
Anthropology offers, instead, scientific models of
social behavior, of which there are now several
approaches that explicitly link social behavior to
material-ecological conditions.
Ecologists need the insights of anthropolo-
gists for understanding the latent functional and
ecological relationships that exist between human
culture and the environment and between person
and person.  Anthropologists, on the other hand,
need better understanding of ecological processes
from the sub-disciplines of ecology that specialize
in complex ecosystem dynamics.  O’Neil et al.
(1986) make a lucid argument for the power of
both ecosystem and community forms of ecology,
and the evidence for the vitality of these two tradi-
tions is in the great volume of research that they
continue to generate.  Many of the criticisms of
ecosystems models in anthropology (Vayda and
McCay 1975; Vayda 1983, 1986; Orlove 1980;
Smith 1984) were made prior to the incorpora-
tion of recent complex systems thinking into ecol-
ogy, and no longer apply.2
While some difficulties with ecosystems
ecology may remain, Winterhalder (1984: 304)
suggests that often critiques have aimed more to
advance alternative perspectives (community ecol-
ogy, evolutionary biology, formalist economics,
Marxist economics) than to condemn energy or
ecosystem studies per se.  Contemporary ecosys-
tems ecology, that now incorporates complex sys-
2 (1) Homeostatic Systems.  A one-time emphasis on equilibrium systems with homeostatic negative feedbacks has been
rejected.  It is replaced by a focus on evolving patterns of informed thermodynamic flow.  (2) The “Calorific Obsession.”
This criticism is made against single-scale, individual selection, with ingestible calories as the primary limiting factor.
Systems of human-environment relations with complex organization at multiple evolving scales have many different limit-
ing resource types–energetic and material.  (3) Units of Analysis.  Larger “units” in some systems theories (political system,
ecosystem, belief system) have been designated from an eclectic set of criteria.  The boundaries of dissipative structures are
marked by proximate free energy gradients (Wicken 1987), and the energetic “negotiation” of those boundaries is continu-
ous.  (4) Typology.  Typological or essentialist criticisms of biological systems theory are made principally against determin-
istic succession models in ecology (Simberloff 1980).  Nonequilibrium thermodynamics restricts the determinacy of classi-
cal dynamics to limited applications, and replaces it with indeterminacy and evolution in biological and physical processes.
(5) Functional Tautologies.  Functional explanation needs to be supported by consequence laws at the level of theory
(Winterhalder 1984).  Evolutionary theory can produce consequence laws for hypothesis testing (ibid.), and an expanded
evolutionary theory (Depew & Weber 1988, 1995) addresses evolution at multiple scales, not just individual organisms,
which applies it to societal analysis.
tems thinking, could be applied in anthropology,
not only to questions of subsistence production,
but to existing models of political and social orga-
nization.  Ecological models of function and struc-
ture have the potential to inform cultural evolu-
tion, political economy, ecosystems anthropology,
and other traditions, as we can inform theirs.
Evolutionism in Anthropology
Anthropology’s original and most endur-
ing approach to building analytic models begins
with the contrast between cultures, in ethnographic
cases, which creates the perspective to identify cul-
tural process, structure, and function.  Evolution-
ism in anthropology was born from this compara-
tive method in the late nineteenth century era of
Darwin.  Under the criteria of the first stream of
science, cultural evolution has endured its share of
criticism.  Lack of specific predictability, properly
narrow and controlled experimental design, or
immediate applicability to policy problem-solving
have been vulnerable spots.  These objections them-
selves are challenged by the second stream of sci-
ence, in which prediction, control, and simple so-
lutions do not prevail.
The nineteenth century cultural evolutionists,
Spencer, Morgan, and Tylor, equated social evolution
with human progress, in which the human condition
was expected to improve through the replacement of
inferior beliefs by those considered superior. This “doc-
trine of progress”(Sanderson 1990) underlies explana-
tions for the emergence of private property from com-
munal forms, of industrial society from militant
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society,  and of monotheism from polytheism.
At the turn of the century, cultural evolu-
tionary theory began to loose supporters, until it
was revitalized by Steward (1955) and White
(1949, 1959).  This history parallels the fortunes
of biological evolutionary theory, which interest-
ingly had declining influence on twentieth cen-
tury biologists until it was revised in the Modern
Synthesis of the 1940’s and 1950’s (Depew and
Weber 1995).  Since that time, cultural evolution-
ary theory has fractured into Evolutionary Ecol-
ogy (Smith and Winterhalder 1992), Life Histo-
ries/ Sociobiology (Chagnon 1988; Hill and
Hurtado 1996), Coevolution / Cultural Darwin-
ism (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Rindos
1985, 1986; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Dunnell
1989; Durham 1991), and a line that more di-
rectly follows from Service, Morgan, Tylor, Stew-
ard and White which is still called Cultural Evolu-
tion (Johnson and Earle 1987).
Cultural evolutionary theory of this last
form is an analytic tradition within the second
stream of science.  A recent example of this tradi-
tion is The Evolution of Human Societies (Johnson
and Earle 1987)3, which embodies the positives and
pitfalls of this stream of science in anthropology.
Following the style of argument employed by prior
cultural evolutionists like Steward (1955), Service
(1975) and Harris (1977), the authors utilize case
3 Johnson and Earle (1987) is better recognized as a fusion between cultural evolution and political economy.  Their book
incorporates political economy’s concerns with asymmetrical economic and political power into a theoretical framework
that is cultural evolutionary and ecological.  Other anthropologists have done the inverse; adopted ecological and evolution-
ary thinking into a principally political-economic framework, in what has been labeled “political ecology” (i.e., Schmink
and Wood 1987; Greenberg and Park 1994).  The heart of the functional relationships within the political ecology model
are those of political economy, specifically the forces/relations of production, the labor theory of value, and others.  The
model has been expanded by applying it to contemporary and historical cases in which human-ecological relationships are
clearly central to a problem, such as “land tenure” or “environmental quality”, however the core functional concerns with
the relations of production remain.  Johnson and Earle (1987), in contrast, is first and foremost ecological and evolutionary
in the tradition of Harris, White, Steward, etc.
4 Clearly the authors entered the exercise with theoretical models.  It is impossible to begin any human activity without
models of the world.  Two questions are important here.  First, how much detail of the final models existed before the
investigation began, and how much emerged from the data itself.  And second, were other models tried on the data and then
rejected based on the relative merits of the analysis.  Bringing to bare alternative models to a problem, evaluation of the
results, and choosing among competing explanations are the hallmarks of the second stream of science as advocated by
Holling.
studies of existing and past societies to build argu-
ments for understanding structure and function
in cultures, and the processes that create change.
What emerges from the comparison and contrast-
ing of cases is a number of hypothesized relation-
ships.4  The result of their analysis is to produce
explanatory models that functionally relate human
social organization5, with human political and eco-
nomic activities, with human subsistence activi-
ties, and with human demography.6  From the con-
text of those models can be generated functional
explanations for other questions, such as Holling’s
resource management dilemmas.  Such social-func-
tional models, that use multiple lines of converg-
ing case study evidence, are appropriate and ac-
ceptable arguments in the second stream of sci-
ence, constrained by real limits to generating un-
derstanding in complex systems.
Developmentalism and Evolution
It was once argued in anthropology that
the process of cultural evolution leads to cultures
with increased energy use per capita (White 1959).
This position has been criticized for its direction-
ality, its developmentalism, its teleology, its appar-
ent faith in progress.  Developmentalism was an
early and persistent thread within evolutionary
theory, with influential supporters like Lamark and
Spencer.   Early biologists who studied embryol-
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol2/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.2.1.1
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5 The criticism by anthropologists of functionalism in anthropology has been an important part of our debate (e.g., Fried-
man 1974; Hallpike 1973; Orans 1974; Gilman 1981), and reflects many of the criticisms of biological evolutionary theory
(Gould and Lewontin 1979) and ecosystem theory (Simberloff 1980).  The re-orientation of science that is evolving out of
the science of complexity (Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Depew and Weber 1995) has deflected much of the debate, and
will be discussed here further.
6 Johnson and Earle (1987) settle on a population pressure (or stress model) of cultural evolution, the merits of which have
been debated for many years in the literature (Cohen 1977; Cowgill 1975; Harris 1979; Haas 1982).  The stress of growing
populations, it is argued, affects subsistence strategies and technologies, which structure and reflect political-economic and
social structural features of a culture.  The realization of these relationships is evidenced in their case studies, and, as would
be expected, is manifest in variation across cultures, dependent on the vagaries of ecology and history.  They repeat a number
of anthropology’s long argued, and generally well-argued, hypothesized causal relationships (Harris 1979; Boserup 1965;
Cohen 1977; Carneiro 1970; Service 1971, 1975), and contribute new insights to that body of theory, although many
issues still remain.  One is the use of population limits or carrying capacities in constructing evolutionary arguments.
Anthropologists have long known that raw population figures are only important in the context of existing economic and
technological conditions.  However, in addition, many slow- or non-renewable environmental resources can also alter the
capacity of an ecology to support a human population.  A once supported population size may, over time, come under
greater, and greater stress as stores of natural resources are consumed.  Population pressure, therefore, is another “moving
target” with many limiting factors that may come into play under countless chance historical circumstances.  Rather than
focusing on population density per se, on some elusive human total (holding technology constant), cultural evolutionists
should be constructing or reconstructing a more thorough environmental context, using ecological understanding of how
ecosystems (with humans) function and change.  The “environment” in “ecological” anthropology must become a dynamic
environment, and so with that, we should be applying theoretical models that represent the dynamics of systems.  Another
fascinating correction to population pressure models is presented in Keegan (1995).
ogy and ecologists studying succession found other
evidence of directionality in nature.
The Modern Evolutionary Synthesis of the
1940’s attempted to replace all notions of direc-
tionality in evolution with a statistical model of
evolution that emphasized natural selection at the
micro-scale of population genetics.  Following suit,
anthropologists re-wrote their explanations of func-
tion and direction in terms that are analogous to
individual reproductive fitness.  A cost-benefit
analysis similar to that used in evolutionary biol-
ogy is often applied to understanding individual
social behaviors.  Aggregate culture is seen to be
the product of individual behaviors, albeit in an
historical cultural context.
At a societal scale, contemporary cultural
evolutionists eschew “progress” in function, point-
ing to the political-economic inequality in culture
change which has emerged from the control over
productive resources by elites (Harris 1979;
Johnson and Earle 1987).  World Systems theo-
rists further expand the scope of power asymme-
tries that cross-cut and integrate cultures into world
scale models (Wallerstein 1974; Sanderson 1995).
These insights are significant improvements over
earlier progressivist and neocolonial social theory,
and are the results of extensive empirical research.
An “Arrow in Time:”  Direction and Teleology
Reexamined
While these approaches have improved
analytic models of direction and function in cul-
ture, recent developments in complexity theory
(Depew and Weber 1995; Prigogine and Stengers
1984; Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Salthe 1985),
in biological evolution (Eldredge 1985; Ereshefsky
1992; Mishler and Donoghue 1992; Wicken
1987), and in ecosystems thinking (Holling 1986;
1995; Johnson 1988, 1992; Odum 1983, 1988,
1996a, 1996b; Odum and Pinkerton 1955; Odum
et al. 1995; O’Neil et al. 1986;  Ulanowicz 1986,
1994) have argued for function in nature at mul-
tiple evolving scales.  As in Holling’s model of eco-
systems, it is argued that function exists in semi-
autonomous scales of objects and relationships with
similar temporal and spatial characteristics (Fig-
ure 1).  Biogeophysical processes are argued to self-
organize into scales that continuously evolve
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through patterns of destruction and renewal (Fig-
ure 2).
With these kinds of insights, there has been
renewed interest in the function of nature evolv-
ing.  Is there functionality, as in White’s model, in
a scaled and complex nature?  In the current re-
search into complex systems, perhaps the most
profound conclusion is that nature displays a ther-
modynamic “arrow in time” (Prigogine and
Stengers 1984).  Change in nature is irreversible,
constructive, and indeterministic due to the Sec-
ond Law dissipation of energy.  While this is intui-
tive (watching a plant grow in time-lapse or two
liquids form a solution), classical Newtonian dy-
namics held that time was, in theory, reversible,
that nature was finally deterministic, and that out-
come could be reduced to the knowable behavior
of basic elements of matter.  The unarticulated
belief in determinism and reducibility in nature
has been long a part of our cultural and scientific
ethos, and continues to structure much of scien-
tific endeavor.
However, this picture of nature has been
abandoned by physicists and chemists in many
FIGURE 1: HOLLING’S SPACE/TIME HIERARCHY (HOLLING 1995:23; reproduced by permission).
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FIGURE 2: HOLLING’S ECOSYSTEM CYCLE (HOLLING 1995:22; reproduced by permission).
problem sets, and been replaced by a model of na-
ture that has structure and is self-organized by the
dissipation of energy into what Prigogine calls “dis-
sipative structures.”  Dissipative structures are the
result of the incessant dissipation of energy in open
systems.  The existence of energy gradients leads
nature to create structure.  While this may sound
teleological, philosophers and scientists have re-
addressed the issue of teleology in nature.  O’Grady
and Brooks (1988), for example, distinguished
between goal-seeking behavior (teleological), end-
directed behavior (teleonomic), and end-resulting
behavior (teleomatic).  While “teleological” de-
scribes human behavior, nature expresses itself also
in teleomatic and teleonomic behavior.
“Teleomatic” behavior is said to be the result of
the existence of matter and energy, as in gravity,
entropic decay, or reaction gradients.  It produces
end-states, but it is not purposeful, and there is no
“control.”  “Teleonomic” behavior is the result of
evolved internal controlling factors that determine
the end-states of processes, as in homeostasis, on-
togeny, and reproduction.
Since Darwin, great effort has been made
to understand the origin of life, evolution, and
development in terms other than teleology.  In re-
cent years each of these issues have been addressed
by applying the teleomatics of nonequilibrium
thermodynamics (Eigen and Schuster 1979, 1982;
Wicken 1987; Depew and Weber 1995; Ho and
Saunders 1984; Kauffman1990).  In each case, end-
directed behavior can be understood to be the prod-
uct of the end-resulting, teleomatics in nature.  The
picture that emerges is one in which both physical
and biological nature is both creative and in flux,
driven by the dissipation of energy.  Change is in-
cessant, and the “pause” of species formation, for
example, is the event that requires explanation.
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This differs from explanations of stability and
change resulting from simple chance, the happen-
stance coming together of two nucleic acids, then
three, leading to a functional strand of DNA, or
the monkey jumping on a typewriter and writing
Hamlet if given long enough.  Nature as depicted
FIGURE 3: ODUM’S SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEM (ODUM 1995:313; reproduced by permission).
Typical energy flows in one unit of a self-organizing system on a source limited from the outside
to a steady flow. Numbers are energy flows (joules) at steady state.
7 Lotka suggested that his “law of evolution” be considered a Fourth Law of Thermodynamics: “Evolution proceeds in such
direction as to make the total energy flux through the system a maximum compatible with the constraints” (Lotka 1924:357;
quoted in Depew and Weber 1995:409).  H.T. Odum has followed Lotka’s work with his principle of Maximum Empower:
“In the competition among self-organizing processes, network designs that maximize empower will prevail” (Odum 1996:16).
Empower is the flow of emergy per time, and emergy is defined as: “Available energy of one kind previously required directly
and indirectly to make a product or service” (1996:13).  Emergy is a currency for representing the work that was necessary
in the production of a product or service.  It represents the energy em-bodied in that product or service.  It is therefore a
shorthand means for situating matter and energy within a system.  Emergy is the currency that Odum recommends in his
brand of ecological economics, called Environmental Accounting (1996).
in nonequilibrium thermodynamics is inherently
self-organizing and hierarchical.  It is argued that
matter forms into structures that facilitate the dis-
sipation of energy.  Biological life accelerates this
process.  Cultural life further so.
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The Fourth Law?7  Maximum Empower
The thermodynamics of this self-organiz-
ing process was first discussed by Lotka (1925) and
was taken up by systems ecologists (Odum 1983;
Ulanowicz 1986) and now by complexity theorists
(Johnson 1992; Wicken 1987; Weber et al. 1989).
An early promoter of these issues, H.T. Odum has
elaborated his position on the energetics of ecosys-
tems and general systems, responding to the surge
of research in complex systems in the last 10 years
(Odum 1983, 1988, 1996a, 1996b; Odum et al.
1995; Odum and Odum 1997).  In Figure 3, one
of Odum’s systems diagrams depicts the self-orga-
nization of dissipative structures, with the forma-
tion of autocatalytic feedback (“reinforcing
pump”).  Nature is understood to organize itself at
multiple scales by using energy and materials to
build structure, which function to feedback and
amplify their capture and use.  This autocatalytic
relationship has been argued by many researchers
since Lotka to be a basic organizing principle in
the emergence of life, and the overall organization
of nature.
Odum calls this natural phenomenon the
Maximum Empower Principle (Odum 1996a:16;
see Hall 1995), which is defined in two ways.  The
first definition addresses the topic of Prigogine’s
dissipative structures,  “Self-organizing systems
disperse energy faster, maximizing the rate of en-
tropy production by developing autocatalytic dis-
sipative structures” (Odum 1996a:21).  His sec-
ond definition is the inverse, and emphasizes the
constructive side of natural systems, “Self-organiz-
ing systems develop autocatalytic storages to maxi-
mize useful power transformations” (Odum
1996:20).  Over time, this process has lead to the
evolution of biogeophysical systems that capture,
use, and dissipate more of the available solar and
earth deep heat energy.  This tendency towards
increasing dissipation gives nature a directionality
that it has lacked in the Newtonian worldview that
has long dominated our scientific and popular
ethos.  More recently it has been shown that this
process does not proceed gradually or linearly or
lead to equilibrium, but rather it creates fluctuat-
ing patterns that we can observe of rapid energy
dissipation followed by longer periods of renewal
and storage.
What’s Evolutionary about Cultural Evolution?
Whatever else may happen, we are reasonably cer-
tain that evolutionary theory will remain incomplete
as long as self-organizational and dissipative phenom-
ena are kept at a distance. (Depew and Weber
1995:479)
Anthropologists working in the tradition
of cultural evolution have had difficulty linking
their work to biological evolutionary theory (Blute
1979; Dunnell 1980), in particular, to the “hard-
ened” Evolutionary Synthesis of this half century,
dominated by population geneticists.  The advances
of complexity theory achieve the inverse, they link
biological evolution to a more general definition
of evolution, one facet of which is the evolution of
culture within ecosystems.  Depew and Weber
(1995) have evaluated the implications of complex-
ity for evolutionary theory.  The scope of their re-
view is vast, spanning many disciplines, which sug-
gests the fertility of interdisciplinary research.  The
essence of the argument can be summarized.
Complexity theory offers plausible expla-
nations for many of the current challenges to the
Evolutionary Synthesis, and it does so within the
“basic assumptions” of the theoretical model.
Neutral selection, molecular clocks, selfish DNA,
hierarchical selection, the emergence of life, the
complex genome, ecological succession, punctu-
ated equilibrium–each of these issues has been dif-
ficult and cumbersome at best to articulate with
the Synthesis and its exclusive concern with natu-
ral selection at the scale of organisms.  Complexity
theory places organisms within a rendering of na-
ture that is hierarchical and self-organizing at mul-
tiple temporal and spatial scales.  Physical selec-
tion (“survival of the stable”) and chemical selec-
tion (“survival of the efficient”) are related to natu-
ral selection by these processes (1995:408).  In this
context, the evolution of life is not a “frozen acci-
dent,” but an explicable elaboration of a basic
theme, although irreducibly and historically
contextualized.  Not surprisingly still, life is ex-
pected to be further organized into species and
ecosystems that exhibit global, emergent properties.
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Cultural evolution since its beginnings has
addressed itself to the emergence of social proper-
ties.  Patterns of social self-organization and his-
toric re-organization have been the focus of nu-
merous case study-driven evolutionary scenarios.
Using case studies of pre-historical, historical, and
extant human groups, anthropologists produced
evolutionary typologies (i.e., band, tribe, chiefdom,
state) and processual models which have aimed to
relate them.  Recent processual models of cultural
evolutionary change, such as Johnson and Earle’s
(1987), have emphasized the interplay between the
human-ecological environment, human demo-
graphics, technological innovation, and political-
economics.  The emergence of novel cultural phe-
nomena (but not the means of evolutionary trans-
mission and selection so heavily emphasized by the
biological evolution of the Synthesis) has been the
dominant focus of explanatory theoretical mod-
els.  Examples of emergent properties of culture
that have occupied cultural evolutionists include
the following:
The emergence of food production technologies
and domestication.
The emergence of labor specialization.
The emergence of private property.
The emergence of large, permanent human social
groups.
The emergence of social inequality, related to the
asymmetrical control of the productive resources
and technologies by factions within a society.
The emergence of organized warfare and special-
ized coercive military/police institutions.
The emergence of markets and the expansion of
trade.
The emergence of political chiefs and chiefly lin-
eages.
The emergence of institutionalized religion and
religious specialists.
The emergence of irrigation agriculture.
The emergence of legal/financial/monetary tech-
nologies.
The emergence of state bureaucracy.
The emergence of modern world systems, and su-
pranational legal/financial institutions.
As emergent cultural behaviors have been
identified and situated historically, cultural evolu-
tionists have worked to relate cultural patterns into
functional-ecological explanatory models.  Cultural
evolutionists have asked why cultural properties
have emerged, what ecological, demographic, tech-
nological, and economic factors might have set the
stage for their appearance, and how cultural prop-
erties functionally interrelate with others.  They
have attempted to explain emergent cultural prop-
erties in material ways, which is similar to the meth-
ods ecologists use to describe ecosystem function
and organization, and the transitions between
multiple, functionally stable ecosystem states.
Some anthropologists have recently sought
to improve cultural evolutionary theory by
strengthening ties to biological evolution (Boyd and
Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981;
Rindos 1985, 1986; Durham 1991).  The direc-
tion of this effort has been heavily influenced by
population genetics.  Unfortunately, this compo-
nent of the Synthesis is arguably the most reduc-
tionist.  The anthropology that it spawns is equally
reductionist, intent on decomposing symbolic cul-
ture into traits that can be manipulated by math-
ematical formulation.  This is occurring in anthro-
pology at a time when the synthesis has come in-
creasingly under pressure, and an expanded syn-
thesis is emerging that emphasizes the developmen-
tal, ecological, hierarchical, integrative, and histori-
cal aspects of nature.  This version of cultural evo-
lutionary theory appears to be moving in the op-
posite direction.
This is particularly unfortunate consider-
ing the ease of fit between the long-standing ver-
sion of cultural evolutionary theory, e.g. Johnson
and Earle (1987), and this expanded synthesis.  The
evolutionary theory emerging from the science of
complexity does not require structures analogous
to genes at multiple physical, chemical, ecosystem,
or cultural scales.  To the contrary, the evolution
of language and culture have tremendously flex-
ible capacities for information storage that are
qualitatively different from genetic representation.
Cultural evolutionary theory, in the tradition of
Johnson and Earle (1987), that emphasizes emer-
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gent cultural and structural properties, exhibiting
internal dynamics and organization, and integrated
to ecological systems by the self-organizing pro-
cesses of energy capture and dissipation is a better
match to an evolving Darwinism.
Cultural Evolution from an Ecology of
Complexity
In all the scales of the known universe, from
atomic processes to the stars, pulsing oscil-
lations appear to be the norm. (Odum
1996a:16)
Anthropologists and other scientists are
beginning to apply complex systems theory to so-
cial theory.  The biological and physical scientists
have approached the problem from numerous per-
spectives and with uneven degrees of social science
sophistication (Allen 1982; Costanza et al. 1993;
De Greene 1993; Dyke 1988; Eldredge and Grene
1992; Forrester 1987; Garfinkel 1987; Geyer 1991;
Gunderson et al. 1995; Harvey and Reed 1994;
Holling 1995; Iberall 1985, 1987;  Jantsch 1982;
Kahil and Boulding 1996; Lancaster 1989; Loye
and Eisler 1987; Maruyama 1982; Nicolis and
Prigogine 1989; Odum 1983; Ulanowicz 1996).
Archaeologists have recently become interested
(Kohler 1992, Gumerman and Gell-Mann 1994),
especially for applying the non-linear, or pulsing
dynamics of complex systems to understanding the
collapse of state societies (Tainter 1988, Yoffee and
Cowgill 1988).  Fewer cultural anthropologists
have found use for complexity (Lansing 1991,
Acheson and Wilson 1996, Park 1992, Carniero
1982), and their works often reflect the mathemati-
cal components of the model, missing the poten-
tial value of its thermodynamic and ecological un-
derpinnings.
In cultural anthropology, R.N. Adams
(1988) produced a groundbreaking and extensive
synthesis of much of complexity theory with an-
thropology, particularly into cultural evolutionary
theory and into political anthropology.  His book
is perhaps the most thorough discussion to date,
but falls short on some accounts.  Adams has at-
tempted to incorporate many of the issues raised
by complexity theory, which include Lotka’s en-
ergy principle, dissipative structures, hierarchical
organization, and others.  His is an effort to ex-
tend complexity theory into the obvious next-fron-
tier of human culture.  He chooses, however, to
concentrate his theory building on the emergence
of political power and social hierarchy, and does
not pursue his own arguments into detailed analy-
sis of human-environment relationships and the
complex ecological context of culture.  By this strat-
egy, he misses some important opportunities to
better utilize the implications of ecological theory
for cultural evolution.
While Adams’ research program is insight-
ful and fertile, the synthesis can be improved by
more completely and thoroughly integrating un-
derstanding of larger-scale ecosystem structure and
function, within which human organization oc-
curs.  More specifically, the critical issue that needs
to be incorporated is resource capture, use, and re-
use in ecosystems with humans.
Natural Resource Use and Re-Use in Ecosystems
with Humans
According to Odum (1983), global envi-
ronmental systems self-organize around renewable
energy use, which originates with solar energy and
earth deep heat, and which fuels weather and geo-
logic systems, and ultimately ecosystems.  This self-
organization results in ecosystems that exhibit puls-
ing between storage and release of energy in the
form of nutrients, biomass, populations and in-
formation (Odum 1996a, 1996b; Odum et al.
1995).  This storage and release occurs at multiple
spatial and temporal scales.  From our human scale,
therefore, we perceive some storages as renewable,
such as fresh water in lakes, or annual grasses, or
seasonal insect populations.  Other storages, how-
ever, we perceive as slow-renewable, like topsoil,
or forest trees, which can be consumed by inten-
sive human use, fire, flood, or some other action,
and require many years to return.8  At our scale we
often call these disasters, but it is becoming in-
creasingly recognized that pulsing is a part of self-
organizing ecosystems on a larger scale, as in the
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8 It may be difficult for some to think of topsoil as a resource that is consumed.  But topsoil is an organic product in
ecosystem growth, and its nutrients can be captured and removed by farming, unless explicitly replaced.
many known fire-adapted ecosystems.  Other stor-
ages we perceive as non-renewable, such as fossil
fuel, or metals (although these too are part of re-
newable geologic cycles at a larger time scale).  All
life, at any scale, is said to organize around these
renewable, slow-renewable, and non-renewable
stores of energy and resources.
Slow-renewable resources have set real lim-
its to the growth of human populations in pre-
history and historical times (Odum and Odum
1997, Adams 1982, Debeir et al. 1991, Perlin
1991, Hardin 1993).  Important resources are top-
soil, wood, metals, stone, reefs, and others.  The
consumption of these storages of solar and earth
energy have been implicated in the expansion of
state societies, in their collapse (Culbert 1988,
Tainter 1988), or less dramatically, in the waves of
use and abandonment of landscape by swidden ag-
riculturalists, pastoralists, or hunter-gatherers.
Humans are not alone in being constrained by re-
sources.  Put more generally, pulses at larger and
smaller temporal and spatial scales, will limit the
size of all biological populations.  This occurs lo-
cally to human populations, and has also occurred
more globally at times (i.e., plague, drought, earth-
quakes, El Niño, hurricanes).  The human differ-
ence is that at short temporal scales (in evolution-
ary time) we have modified our ability to capture
and use additional environmental storages of re-
sources, and our global population size has pulsed
to its current large number.
Understanding environmental resources in
these terms provides a more thorough model of
ecological dynamics for cultural evolutionists.  It
indicates motive for human movement on the land-
scape, and for resource intensification when move-
ment is not possible or undesirable.  This dynamic
produces a different picture of the environment,
one far from homeostatic, one that should be ex-
pected to put stress on human populations from
time to time.  Under the stress of pulses from scales
both slower and faster than human temporal scale,
resource intensifications would at times be in great
demand.  With resource intensifications comes
population growth and the “closing of doors” to
prior, lower-density strategies like hunter-gather-
ing, which since Boserup (1965) has been central
to cultural evolutionary thinking about the envi-
ronment.
Framing now the issue of resource use and
population growth in terms of self-organization and
dissipative structures leads to another perspective
on this important relationship between humans
and resource use in cultural evolution.  As defined
in the Maximum Empower principle above, and
observed in autocatalytic growth cycles, systems
that use energy to build structure are often “re-
warded” by gaining access to more energy.  Hu-
man action in agricultural intensification builds
structure that captures more energy by utilizing
storages of slow-renewables like topsoil, non-
renewables like phosphate and oil, and renewable
energy.  Our use of storages makes possible the
capture of more energy for growing more of us.
The human-agriculture ecosystem is energetically
rewarded and expands to cover more landscape
because it taps resource storages that were previ-
ously unused.  In macro energetic terms, this hu-
man system incorporates or replaces other systems
because it captures and dissipates more energetic
resources.
Where are the limits?  The limits are in the
storages.  Netting (1993) has shown in great detail
the incredible diversity and ingenuity of small-
holder farmers in capturing slow-renewables and
renewable resources, and their efforts to maintain
them.  These elaborate systems have evolved be-
cause of the limits imposed by natural ecosystems.
New production strategies and technologies have
been the human response to limits, and they have
come in two principal forms.  The first is the in-
tensive use of human labor.  However, the obvious
limit to that strategy is that it rewards the produc-
tion of new labor, more people, which eventually
pushes on the limits of the landscape to expan-
sion.  The other complementary strategy is to cap-
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ture additional storages of resources, which requires
new technologies, and is slower in coming due to
chance events and prior technologies.  This cen-
tury especially has shown the greatest return to this
strategy, to the point that we are now essentially
“eating oil” (Green 1978).  However, other tech-
nologies have been extremely important histori-
cally in gaining access to new resources, particu-
larly plows for access to deeper soils, axes for open-
ing up forest topsoil to farming, draught animal
technologies, water delivery systems, storage facili-
ties, iron and steel smelting, and others.
Does cultural evolution lead to more en-
ergy per person?  Cultural evolution should not
produce more energy that is captured and con-
trolled by each culture member.  The capture and
use of resources is systemic, and results in more
people, some with less energy than members of
less complex cultural systems.  According to this
theoretical model, the teleomatics of nature have
resulted in the emergence of life, which has now
resulted in the emergence of human culture.  The
emergence of both was entirely unpredictable from
the start, and both exist only in an historical con-
text that channels any future evolution.
Does this argue for the progressive and in-
evitable rise of civilization in energetic terms?  Again
no, for the increased capture and use of resources
by humans has been a halting process, not con-
tinuous, following environmental pulses at larger
scales, and technology induced human pulses and
contractions.  Dissipative structures are argued to
evolve only because they can.  Odum contends that
we are currently entering a period of contraction,
in energetic terms, due to diminishing returns on
fossil fuel use, and there is no evidence that a new
technology can give nearly the same return that oil
did in its years of high energetic return (Odum
and Odum 1997).  It is expected now that im-
proved efficiency, materials recycling, and a con-
centration on maintaining renewable resources will
need to be the strategy for a desirable standard of
living.
Science-Lead or Science-Normalized?
Expressions of frustration from members
of the scientific community with the use of sci-
ence, or lack thereof, in forming national policy
are ubiquitous.  Holling, for example, calls the
growth of rigidity and unresponsiveness in man-
agement agencies a “pathology of management.”
National scientists, in our nation and in others,
are routinely ignored by national governments,
despite national and international support for the
quality of their research and conclusions, as in the
long medical battle against smoking in this coun-
try.  Scientific research condemning deforestation
and resettlement in the Brazilian Amazon in the
1980s, conducted by Brazilians (Fearnside 1986),
for example, was applauded nationally and inter-
nationally, but out-of-hand ignored in final policy
decisions.  In fact, the pattern of scientific involve-
ment in policy, as in Amazon “resettlement,” of-
ten follows the sequence of policy decision, then
scientific assessment of consequences.  In Holling’s
case of forest management in New Brunswick, sci-
ence (or better said, new technologies) led to a
pattern of forest timber intensive exploitation.
Holling has recounted how forest management
policy, once set in motion, became rigid and self-
maintaining, leading to surprising environmental
catastrophe when chance events later occurred.
Cultural evolutionary models would inter-
pret the situation differently, beginning by placing
“science” and “management” in the context of state
societies and world systems.  State societies are in-
herently hierarchical, with political and economic
power concentrated among a minority of elites.
What is shared by most recent accounts of the evo-
lution of state societies9 is a focus on the intensifi-
cation of production, which co-evolves with the
unequal control of productive resources, and which
is buttressed by legal and coercive (police, mili-
tary) institutions.  Whatever else it does, the con-
centration of capital in state societies makes pos-
sible the production of resource intensive prod-
ucts, such as oil tankers or automobiles or armies,
9 The evolution of culture leading to state societies has been long studied in anthropology, and has led to a number of
theoretical reconstructions (Johnson and Earle 1989; Harris 1979; Service 1971, 1975; Fried 1967, 1978; Carneiro 1970;
Cohen 1977; White 1959; Steward 1955; Morgan 1877; see Sanderson 1990 for a current review).
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which feedback to produce state societies that are
the most exploitative of energetic resources that
the world has ever seen.  While other social rela-
tions of production are conceivable, none has oc-
curred that could compete with capitalism in these
terms.  Stated otherwise, perhaps capitalism was
the first “technological” innovation of its capacity
for production and consumption, and others could
never overcome the “first cover” advantage.10
In this context it can be asked whether sci-
ence leads the evolution of capitalist state societ-
ies?  The discourse of “scientific progress”, that was
emergent with capitalism, tells us that it does. The
cultural evolutionary argument, however, suggests
that technological innovations are an extremely
desirable answer to resource and population stress,
because they can alleviate both in the short term,
and simultaneously enhance the political and eco-
nomic power of elites who control the technolo-
gies.  The case of the steam engine in the last cen-
tury is instructive because it flourished as a pro-
ductive technology for 50 years before the science
existed to explain it.  In other cases, scientific
knowledge exists (we have the know-how to land
people on Mars), but it is not being put to use.
Production and productive technologies co-evolve.
Stated in terms of complex systems, however, nei-
ther science nor technology lead the evolution of
the state, but rather both will always be entrained
to the current production context.
Within this evolutionary model, concepts
like “management institutions” can also be placed
in functional relationships.  The rewards to eco-
nomic production underwrite the state apparatus.
Therefore, the evolutionary model suggests that
states will provide an economic environment that
fosters production, that management institutions
10 “First cover,” also known as “lock-in” is an ecosystems concept.  It refers to the fact that in succession it is often the first
plant species to enter or “cover” an open niche that will be successful at a point in time, regardless of some absolute measure
of efficiency.  This emphasizes the stochastic nature of ecological and evolutionary thinking in the creation of historical
scenarios of change in complex systems.
11 Escobar (1996) discusses this issue from the perspective of a “poststructuralist” political ecology. Both models see the
expansionary nature of capitalism, the “logic of reckless capital” in his terms, as the immediate cause.  The evolutionary-
ecological model, however, sees the current crisis of capitalism as imposed by a contracting resource base, while Escobar
looks first to the so-called contradictions of capitalism.
will evolve to promote economic growth when
growth is possible.  The growth of production is
dependent on access to productive resources.  The
first priority of state institutions, it can therefore
be expected, will be to make those resources avail-
able by whatever means in their power- legal, eco-
nomic, or coercive.
Given these considerations, the resource
management practices encountered by Holling are
not “pathological.”  They were not motivated by
science either.  They were driven by the available
technologies for resource exploitation.  They were
motivated by the same demands that have moti-
vated all state societies.  Why has science now been
brought into the equation by state and private in-
terests?  Because the resource is threatened.  The
same question should always be asked when sci-
ence is funded by national governments.  Why, for
instance, are ecological issues the world over now
gaining their greatest audience in history, lead to-
day by the discourses of “sustainable development”
and “biodiversity conservation,” when much of the
science that supports them has been available for
decades?  For many reasons, but probably the most
important is the growing threat to world ecosys-
tems, and therefore world productive systems.11
Looking at these issues in recent historical
terms, why then did science and management bu-
reaucracy balloon in the 1960s and 1970s, only
now to be pruned in the name of efficiency?  Fol-
lowing the ecological and cultural evolutionary
argument made to this point, it grew because it
was able to.  The fossil fuel technologies that
emerged from World War II were extremely pro-
ductive, in energetic terms.  However, if Odum is
accurate, the world returns on that productive strat-
egy are flattening out, and will eventually decline.
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This should be expected because the current world
economy is ultimately dependent on finite stor-
ages of fuel and other resources.
Should we be concerned?  If we believe that
social science will be a useful tool for maintaining
a reasonable standard of living in a contracting
world economy then we should be worried.  The
current neoliberal “reforms” are producing a mar-
ket academia that can pay its way.  These reforms
reward the “hard” sciences and technology, and
penalize the social, humanistic, and critical tradi-
tions of knowing, because of their uncertain re-
turns to investment.  This suggests clearly the tight
interconnectedness of academics with the current
productive strategy.  However, it also indicates the
current inability of the social sciences to demon-
strate its potential for understanding the current
dilemma.
Conclusions
Understanding science and government in
terms of analytic models of cultural evolution does
not lead to political or academic inaction or resig-
nation.  To the contrary, it should be clear by now
that the application of complexity theory to evo-
lution, both biological and cultural, suggests the
indeterminacy of nature, and the central role of
chance and action.  Appreciation of the physical
limits to growth is sobering, but it is essential for
directing science and society to deal with the fuller
nature of our world social and ecological dilem-
mas.  Appreciation of the functional interrelation-
ships within culture, and between culture and en-
vironment, is needed to frame the debate and in-
form decision making.
Science-minded anthropologists (and other
scientists) continue to be influenced by the meth-
ods associated with the reductionist stream of sci-
ence, and by the expectations of mechanistic ex-
planations and control, to focus on simple prob-
lems with single or very few independent variables,
essentially to abandon the study of the organiza-
tion of emergent variables (such as economic sec-
tor organization, or human-environment dynam-
ics), which for many years sustained anthropology
and set it apart from other sciences.
Complexity theory and its expanded evo-
lutionary synthesis can be integrated into cultural
evolution and ecological anthropology.  Theory
building of the type best known to cultural evolu-
tionists, of mounting processual arguments based
on case study evidence, is not an evolutionary dead
end.  The type of science now emerging from the
study of complex systems indicates that anthro-
pology has much to contribute to the interdisci-
plinary study of complexity in natural systems.
References Cited
ADAMS, R. N.
1982    Paradoxical Harvest.  Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
1988    The Eighth Day:  Social Evolution as
the Self-Organization of Energy.
Austin: University of Texas Press.
ACHESON, J. M., AND J. A. WILSON.
1996    Order out of Chaos:  The Case for
Parametric Fisheries Management.
American Anthropologist
98(3):979-594.
ALLEN, P. M.
1982  “Self-Organization in the Urban
System,” in Self-Organization and
Dissipative Structures:  Applications
in the Physical and Social Sciences.
Edited by W. C. Schieve and P.  M.
Allen, pp. 132-158.  Austin:  Uni-
versity of Texas Press.
ALLEN, T. F. H., AND T. B. STARR.
1982    Hierarchy:  Perspectives for Ecologi-
cal Complexity.  Chicago:  Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
BECHTEL, W., AND R. C. RICHARDSON.
1993    Discovering Complexity:  Decom-
position and Localization as Strat-
egies in Scientific Research.
Princeton, NJ:  Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
22 Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology Vol. 2 1998
BENNETT, J. W.
1988    “Anthropology and Development:
The Ambiguous Engagement,” in
Production and Autonomy:  Anthro-
pological Studies and Critiques of
Development, Monographs in Eco-
nomic Anthropology, No. 5. Ed-
ited by  John W. Bennett and John
R. Bowen,  pp. 1-29.  Lanham,
MD:  University Press of America.
BLUTE, M.
1979   Sociocultural Evolutionism:  An
Untried Theory.  Behavioral Science
24:46-59.
BOAS, F.
1938   The Mind of Primitive Man. New
York:  Macmillan.
BOSERUP, E.
1965   The Conditions of Agricultural
Growth.  Chicago:  Aldine.
BOYD, R., AND P. J. RICHERSON.
1985   Culture and the Evolutionary Pro-
cess.  Chicago:  The University of
Chicago Press.
CARNEIRO, R. L.
1970    A Theory of the Origin of the State.
Science  169:733-738.
1982     “Successive Reequilibrations as the
Mechanism of Cultural Evolu-
tion,”  in Self-Organization and
Dissipative Structures:  Applications
in the Physical and Social Sciences.
Edited by W. C. Schieve and P. M.
Allen,  pp. 110-115.  Austin:  Uni-
versity of Texas Press.
CAVALLI-SFORZA, L. L., AND M. W. FELDMAN.
1981   Cultural Transmission and Evolution:
A Quantitative Approach.
Princeton:  Princeton University
Press.
CHAGNON, N. A.
1988    Life Histories, Blood Revenge, and
Warfare in a Tribal Population.
Science 239:985-93.
COHEN, M. N.
1977   The Food Crisis in Prehistory.  New
Haven:  Yale University Press.
1978    “Population Pressure and the Ori-
gins of Agriculture:  An Archaeo-
logical Example from the Coast of
Peru,”  in Advances in Andean Ar-
chaeology.  Edited by David L.
Browman,  pp. 91-132.  The
Hague:  Mouton Publishers.
COSTANZA, R., L. WAINGER, C. FOLKE, AND K.
GORAN MALER.
1993    Modeling Complex Ecological Eco-
nomic Systems:  Toward and Evo-
lutionary, Dynamic Understand-
ing of People and Nature.
BioScience 43(8):545-555.
COWGILL, G. L.
1975   On the Causes and Consequences
of Ancient and Modern Population
Changes.  American Anthropologist
77:505-525.
CULBERT, T. P.
1988   “The Collapse of Classic Maya Civi-
lization,”  in The Collapse of An-
cient States and Civilizations.  Ed-
ited by N. Yoffee and G. L.
Cowgill,  pp. 69-101.  Tucson:
University of Arizona Press.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol2/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.2.1.1
23Georgia Journal of Ecological AnthropologyVol. 2 1998
DEBEIR, J., J. DELEAGE, AND D. HEMERY.
1991 In the Servitude of Power:  Energy
and Civilization through the Ages.
London and New Jersey:  Zed
Books.
DE GREENE, K. B.
1993   Evolutionary Structure in the In-
formational Environmental Field
of Large-Scale Human Systems.
Journal of Social and Evolutionary
Systems 16(2):215-230.
DEPEW, D. J., AND B. H. WEBER.
1988     “Consequences of Nonequilibrium
Thermodynamics for the Darwin-
ian Tradition,”  in Entropy, Infor-
mation, and Evolution:  New Per-
spectives on Physical and Biological
Evolution. Edited by Bruce H. We-
ber, D. J. Depew, and J. D. Smith,
pp. 317-354.  Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
1995  Darwinism Evolving:  Systems Dy-
namics and the Genealogy of Natu-
ral Selection.  Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
DEWALT, B. R., AND P. J. PELTO, EDITORS.
1985   Micro and Macro Levels of Analysis
in Anthropology:  Issues in Theory
and Research.  Boulder and Lon-
don:  Westview Press.
DUNNELL, R. C.
1980   Evolutionary Theory and Archae-
ology.  Advances in Archaeological
Method and Theory 3: 35-99.
1989     “Aspects of the Application of Evo-
lutionary Theory in Archaeology,”
in Archaeological Thought in
America.  Edited by C. C.
Lamberg-Karlovsky. Cambridge:
Cambridgeshire.
DURHAM, W. H.
1990   Advances in Evolutionary Culture
Theory.  Annual Reviews of Anthro-
pology  19:187-210.
1991   Coevolution:  Genes, Culture, and
Human Diversity.  Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
DYKE, C.
           1988    “Cities as Dissipative Structures,”
in Entropy, Information, and Evo-
lution:  New Perspectives on Physi-
cal and Biological Evolution.  Ed-
ited by Bruce H. Weber, David J.
Depew, and James D. Smith,  pp.
355-367.  Cambridge, MA:  The
MIT Press.
EHRENREICH, R. M., C. L. CRUMLEY, AND J. E. LEVY,
EDITORS.
1995   Heterarchy and the Analysis of
Complex Societies.   Archaeologi-
cal Papers of the American Anthro-
pological Association, Number 6.
Washington DC: American An-
thropological Association.
EIGEN, M., AND P. SCHUSTER.
1979   The Hypercycle.  Berlin:  Springer-
Verlag.
1982     Stages of Emerging Life:  Five Prin-
ciples of Early Organization.  Jour-
nal of Molecular Biology  19:47-61.
ELDREDGE, N.
1985   Unfinished Synthesis:  Biological Hi-
erarchies and Modern Evolutionary
Thought.  New York:  Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
ELDREDGE, N., AND M. GRENE.
1992    Interactions:  The Biological Context
of Social Systems.  New York:  Co-
lumbia University Press.
24 Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology Vol. 2 1998
ERESHEFSKY, M.
1992 The Units of Evolution:  Essays on
the Nature of Species.  Cambridge,
MA:  MIT Press.
ESCOBAR, A.
1996 Construction Nature:  Elements
for a Post-Structuralist Political
Ecology.  Futures   28(4):325-343.
FEARNSIDE, P. M.
1986   Spatial Concentration of Defores-
tation in the Brazilian Amazon.
Ambio 15(2):74-81.
FORRESTER, J. W.
1987   Nonlinearity in High-Order Mod-
els of Social Systems.  European
Journal of Operational Research
30:104-109.
FRIED, M. H.
1967   The Evolution of Political Society:
An Essay in Political Anthropology.
New York:  Random House.
1978 “The State, the Chicken, and the
Egg; or What Came First? ”  in Ori-
gins of the State:  The Anthropology
of Political Evolution.  Edited by R.
Cohen and E. R. Service,   pp. 35-
47.  Philadelphia:  Institute for the
Study of Human Issues.
FRIEDMAN, J.
1974 Marxism, Structuralism and Vul-
gar Materialism.  Man 9:444-469.
GARFINKEL, A.
1987 “The Slime Mold Dictyostelium as
a Model of Self-Organization in
Social Systems,”  in Self-Organiz-
ing Systems:  The Emergence of Or-
der. Edited by  F.E. Yates, A.
Garfinkel, D.O. Walter, and G.B.
Yates,   pp. 181-212.  New York
and London:  Plenum Press.
GEYER, F., EDITOR.
1991   The Cybernetics of Complex Systems:
Self-Organization, Evolution, Social
Change.  Salinas,CA:  Intersystems.
GILMAN, A.
1981   The Development of Social Strati-
fication in Bronze Age Europe.
Current Anthropology 22(1):1-23.
GOULD, S. J.,  AND R. C. LEWONTIN.
1979   The Spandrels of San Marco and
the Panglossian Paradigm:  A Cri-
tique of the Adaptationist
Programme.  Proc. R. Soc. Lond.
205:581-598.
GREEN, M. B.
1978   Eating Oil:  Energy Use in Food Pro-
duction.  Boulder:  Westview Press.
GREENBERG, J. B., AND T. K. PARK.
1994   Political Ecology.  Journal of Politi-
cal Ecology  1:1-11.
GUMERMAN, G. J., AND M. GELL-MANN, EDITORS.
1994   Understanding Complexity in the
Prehistoric Southwest.  SFI Stud-
ies in the Sciences of Complexity,
Proc. Vol. XVI.  Addison-Wesley.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol2/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.2.1.1
25Georgia Journal of Ecological AnthropologyVol. 2 1998
GUNDERSON, L. H., C. S. HOLLING, AND S. S. LIGHT,
EDITORS.
1995   Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal
of Ecosystems and Institutions.  New
York:  Columbia University Press.
HAAS, J.
1982 The Evolution of the Prehistoric
State.  New York:  Columbia Uni-
versity Press.
HALL, A. S., EDITOR.
1995 Maximum Power:  The Ideas and
Applications of H.T. Odum.  Uni-
versity Press of Colorado.
HALLPIKE, C. R.
1973   Functionalist Interpretations of
Primitive Warfare.  Man  8(3):451-
470.
HANDWERKER, W. P.
1989   The Origins and Evolution of Cul-
ture.  American Anthropologist
91(2):313-326.
HARDIN, G.
1993 Living Within Limits:  Ecology, Eco-
nomics, and Population Taboos.
New York and Oxford:  Oxford
University Press.
HARVEY, D. L., AND M. H. REED.
1994 The Evolution of Dissipative So-
cial Systems.  Journal of Social and
Evolutionary Systems 17(4):371-
411.
HARRIS, M.
1977   Cannibals and Kings:  The Origins
of Cultures.  New York:  Random
House.
1979   Cultural Materialism:  The Struggle
for a Science of Culture.  New York:
Random House.
HILL, K., AND A. M. HURTADO.
1996   Ache Life History:  The Ecology and
Demography of a Foraging People.
New York:  Aldine de Gruyter.
HO, M., AND P. T. SAUNDERS.
1984 “Pluralism and Convergence in
Evolutionary Theory,”  in Beyond
Neo-Darwinism:  An Introduction
to the New Evolutionary Paradigm,
Edited by  Mae-Wan Ho and P. T.
Saunders,   pp. 3-11.  London:
Academic Press.
HOLLING, C. S.
1986 “Resilience of Ecosystems: Local
Surprise and Global Change,”  in
Sustainable Development of the bio-
sphere. Edited by  W. C. Clark and
R. E. Munn,  pp.292-317.  Cam-
bridge:  Cambridge University
Press.
1993 Investing in Research for
Sustainability.  Ecological Applica-
tions 3(4):552-555.
1995 “What Barriers?  What Bridges,”
in Barriers and Bridges to the Re-
newal of Ecosystems and Institutions.
Edited by L. H. Gunderson, C. S.
Holling, and S. S. Light,   pp. 3-
34.  New York:  Columbia Uni-
versity Press.
IBERALL, A. S.
1985 Outlining Social Physics for Mod-
ern Societies—Locating Culture,
Economics and Politics:  The En-
lightenment Reconsidered.  Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci.  82:5582-5584.
26 Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology Vol. 2 1998
IBERALL, A. S.
1987    “A Physics for Studies of Civiliza-
tion,”   in Self-Organizing Systems:
The Emergence of Order.  Edited by
F. E. Yates, A. Garfinkel, D. O.
Walter, and G. B. Yates,   pp. 521-
542.  New York and London:  Ple-
num Press.
JANTSCH, E.
1982 “From Self-Reference to Self-Tran-
scendence:  The Evolution of Self-
Organization Dynamics,”  in Self-
Organization and Dissipative Struc-
tures:  Applications in the Physical
and Social Sciences.  Edited by W.
C. Schieve  and P. M. Allen,   pp.
344-353.  Austin:  University of
Texas Press.
JOHNSON, A. W., AND T. EARLE.
1987   The Evolution of Human Societies:
From Foraging Group to Agrarian
State.  Stanford, CA:  Stanford
University Press.
JOHNSON, L.
1988 “ The Thermodynamic Origin of
Ecosystems:  A Tale of Broken
Symmetry,”  in Entropy, Informa-
tion, and Evolution:  New Perspec-
tives on Physical and Biological Evo-
lution.  Edited by B. H. Weber, D.
J. Depew, and J. D. Smith,  pp.
75-106.  Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
1992 An Ecological Approach to
Biosystem Thermodynamics.  Bi-
ology and Philosophy 7:35-60.
KAHLIL, E. L., AND K. E. BOULDING, EDITORS.
1996   Evolution, Order and Complexity.
London and New York:
Routledge.
KAUFFMAN, S.
1990 Origins of Order: Self Organization
and Selection in Evolution. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
KEEGAN, W. F.
1995   Modeling Dispersal in the Prehis-
toric West Indies.  World Archaeol-
ogy  26(3):400-420.
KOHLER, T. A.
1992   Prehistoric Human Impact on the
Environment in the Upland North
American Southwest.  Population
and Environment  13:255-268.
LANCASTER, J.
1989   The Theory of Radially Evolving
Energy.  Intern. J. General Systems
16:43-73.
LANSING, S. J.
1991   Priests and Programmers:  Technolo-
gies of Power in the Engineered
Landscape of Bali.  Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
LOTKA, A. J.
1925   Physical Biology.  Baltimore:  Will-
iams and Wilkins.
LOYE, D., AND R. EISLER.
1987   Chaos and Transformation:  Impli-
cations of Nonequilibrium Theory
for Social Science and Society.
Behavioral Science  32:53-68.
MARUYAMA, M.
1982     “Four Different Causal Metatypes
in Biological and Social Sciences,”
in Self-Organization and Dissipative
Structures:  Applications in the Physi-
cal and Social Sciences. Edited by
W. C. Schieve and P. M. Allen,  pp.
354-361.  Austin:  University of
Texas Press.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol2/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.2.1.1
27Georgia Journal of Ecological AnthropologyVol. 2 1998
MISHLER, B. D., AND M. J. DONOGHUE.
1992 “Species Concepts:  A Case for Plu-
ralism,”  in The Units of Evolution:
Essays on the Nature of Species. Ed-
ited by M. Ereshefsky,  pp. 121-
137.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press.
MORAN, E. F.
1990 “Level of Analysis and Analytical
Level Shifting:  Examples from
Amazonian Ecosystem Research,”
in The Ecosystem Concept in Anthro-
pology (2nd ed.). Edited by E. F.
Moran,  pp. 279-308.  Boulder,
CO:  Westview Press.
MORGAN, L. H.
1877   Ancient Society.  New York:  Holt,
Rinehart and Winston.
NETTING, ROBERT MCC.
1993   Smallholders, Householders:  Farm
Families and the Ecology of Inten-
sive, Sustainable Agriculture.
Stanford, CA:  Stanford University
Press.
ODUM, H. T.
1983   Systems Ecology.  New York:  John
Wiley.
1988   Self-Organization, Transformity,
and Information.  Science
242:1132-1139.
1996a Environmental Accounting.  Emergy
and Decision Making.  New York:
John Wiley.
1996b  Scales of Ecological Engineering.
Ecological Engineering   6:7-19.
ODUM, H. T., AND E. P. ODUM.
1997    A Prosperous Way Down:  Principles
and Policies.  Niwot, CO:  Univer-
sity Press of Colorado.
ODUM, W. E.,  E. P. ODUM, AND H. T. ODUM.
1995 Nature’s Pulsing Paradigm.  Estu-
aries 18(4):547-555.
ODUM, H. T., AND R. C. PINKERTON.
1955 Time’s Speed Regulator:  The Op-
timum Efficiency for Maximum
Power Output in Physical and Bio-
logical Systems.  American Scien-
tist 43:321-343.
O’GRADY, R. T., AND D. R. BROOKS.
1988 “Teleology and Biology,”  in En-
tropy, Information, and Evolution:
New Perspectives on Physical and
Biological Evolution. Edited by B.
H. Weber, D. J. Depew, and J. D.
Smith,  pp. 285-316.  Cambridge,
MA:  The MIT Press.
O’NEILL, R. V., D. L. DEANGELIS, J. B. WAIDE,
AND T. F. H. ALLEN.
1986 A Heirarchical Concept of Ecosys-
tems.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton
University Press.
ORANS, M.
1974 Domesticating the Functional
Dragon:  An Analysis of Piddocke’s
Potlatch.  American Anthropologist.
77:312-328.
ORLOVE, B. S.
1980 Ecological Anthropology.  Annual
Reviews of Anthropology  9:235-73.
PARK, T. K.
1992 Early Trends Toward Class Strati-
fication:  Chaos, Common Prop-
erty, and Flood Recession Agricul-
ture.  American Anthropologist
94:90-117.
PERLIN, J.
1991  A Forest Journey:  The Role of Wood
in the Development of Civilization.
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
28 Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology Vol. 2 1998
PRIGOGINE, I.
1980 From Being to Becoming:  Time and
Complexity in the Physical Sciences.
New York:  W.H. Freeman and
Company.
PRIGOGINE, I., AND I. STENGERS.
1984 Order Out of Chaos:  Man’s New
Dialogue with Nature.  Toronto:
Bantam Books.
RINDOS, D.
1985   Darwinian Selection, Symbolic
Variation, and the Evolution of
Culture.  Current Anthropology
26(1):65-88.
1986   The Genetics of Cultural Anthro-
pology:  Toward a Genetic Model
for the Origin of the Capacity for
Culture.  Journal of Anthropologi-
cal Archaeology  5:1-38.
SALTHE, S. N.
1985 Evolving Hierarchical Systems:
Their Structure and Representation.
New York:  Columbia University
Press.
SANDERSON, S. K.
1990 Social Evolutionism:  A Critical His-
tory.  Cambridge, MA:  Blackwell.
SANDERSON, S. K., EDITOR.
1995   Civilizations and World Systems:
Studying World-Historical Change.
Walnut Creek:  AltaMira Press.
SCHMINK, M., AND C. H. WOOD.
1987 “The “Political Ecology” of
Amazonia,”  in Lands at Risk in the
Third World:  Local Level Perspec-
tives. Edited by P. D. Little,  M.
M. Horowitz, and A. E. Nyerqes,
pp.38-57.  Boulder and London:
Westview.
SERVICE, E. R.
1971 Primitive Social Organization:  An
Evolutionary Perspective. New York:
Random House.
1975 Origins of the State and Civilization:
The Process of Cultural Evolution.
New York:  W.W. Norton and
Company.
SIMBERLOFF, D.
1980 A Succession of Paradigms in Ecol-
ogy:  Essentialism to Materialism
and Probabilism.  Synthese  43:3-
39.
SMITH, E. A.
1984   “Anthropology, Evolutionary Ecol-
ogy, and the Explanatory Limita-
tions of the Ecosystem Concept,”
in The Ecosystem Concept in Anthro-
pology. Edited by Emilio F. Moran.
Boulder, CO:  Westview Press.
SMITH, E. A., AND B. WINTERHALDER.
1992 Evolutionary Ecology and Human
Behavior. New York: Aldine de
Gruyter.
STEWARD, J. H.
1955 Theory of Culture Change:  The
Methodology of Multilinear Evolu-
tion.  Urbana:  University of Illi-
nois Press.
SOUTH, S.
1990 “From Thermodynamics to a Sta-
tus Artifact Model:  Spanish Santa
Elena,”  in Columbian Conse-
quences (Vol. 2). Edited by D. H.
Thomas,  pp.329-341.  Washing-
ton and London:  Smithsonian
Institution Press.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol2/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.2.1.1
29Georgia Journal of Ecological AnthropologyVol. 2 1998
TAINTER, J.
1988   The Collapse of Complex Societies.
Cambridge:  Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
ULANOWICZ, R. E.
1986   Growth and Development:  Ecosys-
tems Phenomenology.  New York:
Springer-Verlag.
1996 “The Propensities of Evolving Sys-
tems,”  in Evolving Order and Com-
plexity.  Edited by E. L. Kahlil and
K. E. Boulding. London and New
York:  Routledge.
VAYDA, A. P.
1983   Progressive Contextualization:
Methods for Research in Human
Ecology. Human Ecology
11(3):265-281.
1986   Holism and Individualism in Eco-
logical Anthropology.  Reviews in
Anthropology  295-313.
VAYDA, A. P., AND B. J. MCCAY.
1975 New Directions in Ecology and
Ecological Anthropology.  Annual
Review of Anthropology  4:293-306.
WALLERSTEIN, I.
1974   The Modern World-System I:  Capi-
talist Agriculture and the Origins of
the European World-Economy in the
Sixteenth Century.  New York:  Aca-
demic Press.
WHITE, L. A.
1949   The Science of Culture.  New York:
Grove Press.
1959   The Evolution of Culture:  The De-
velopment of Civilization to the Fall
of Rome.  New York:  McGraw-Hill
Book Company.
WICKEN, J. S.
1987   Evolution, Thermodynamics, and
Information:  Extending the Dar-
winian Program.  New York:  Ox-
ford University Press.
WINTERHALDER, B.
1984 Reconsidering the Ecosystem Con-
cept.  Reviews in Anthropology
11(4):301-307.
YOFFEE, N., AND G. L. COWGILL, EDITORS.
1988   The Collapse of Ancient States and
Civilizations. Tucson:  University
of Arizona Press.
